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-Part 16 - Types of Contracts
-FC 16.101(a) Selecting contract type.
-A wide selection of contract types is available to the government and contractors in order to
-provide flexibility in acquiring the large variety and volume of supplies and services required by
-agencies. Contract types vary according to the degree and timing of the responsibility assumed
-by the contractor for the costs of performance; and the amount and nature of the profit incentive
-offered to the contractor for achieving or exceeding specified standards or goals.
-Contract types are grouped into two broad categories: fixed-price contracts (see subpart 16.2)
-and cost-reimbursement contracts (see subpart 16.3). The continuum of contract types range
-from firm-fixed-price, in which the contractor has full responsibility for the performance costs, to
-cost-plus-fixed-fee, in which the contractor has minimal responsibility for the performance costs.
-In between are various incentive contracts (see subpart 16.4), in which the contractor’s
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+part 16 streamlining.
+The PTAI provides targeted support for streamlining FAR part 16 ordering procedures by
+offering proven innovative approaches that agencies can adopt and adapt to their
+procurements. The use of PTAI and other innovative approaches directly support FAR part 16
+core objectives of reducing time, complexity, and cost while maintaining acquisition integrity and
+achieving optimal mission outcomes. Five procedures that a contracting officer can use specific
+to the ordering process are highlighted below. See the Periodic Table of Acquisition Innovation
+(PTAI) for additional information and additional approaches.
+● Phased down-select processes. Consider phased evaluation processes and down-
+select approaches that progressively narrow the competitive field through increasingly
+detailed assessments. Initial phases might evaluate high-level solution approaches and
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 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Companion
-responsibility for the performance costs and the profit or fee incentives offered are tailored to the
-uncertainties involved in contract performance.
-In line with 1.102, Guiding principles for the System, agencies are encouraged to use innovative
-contracting types and approaches to the maximum extent practicable to (1) achieve mission
-outcomes; (2) promote efficiency and economy in contracting; (3) avoid unnecessary burdens
-for agencies and contractors; and (4) align with commercial practices.
-The objective is to select a contract type and pricing structure (or estimated cost and fee) that
-are most appropriate to the circumstances of the acquisition. Factors to consider may include
-reasonable contractor risk and providing the contractor with incentives for efficient, cost-
-effective, and quality performance.
-FC 16.2 Firm-Fixed-Unit-Price (FFUP) contract.
-A firm-fixed-unit-price (FFUP) contract establishes a fixed-price(s) for supplies or services but
-does not establish the quantity, except for a guaranteed minimum and a ceiling. Volume
-discounts and equitable adjustments to the unit price based on actual usage do not render the
-contract other than a firm-fixed-unit-price contract.
-A FFUP contract is suitable when the government needs supplies or services but is unsure of
-the exact quantity. The contract specifies units of supply or service, estimated quantities, and
-unit prices, and may include a clause for price adjustment based on actual usage (e.g., volume
-discount or other economies of scale).
-FFUP contracts should require identifiable, discrete, and common units of service, each
-representing a consistent measure of value and work output. The unit price covers all costs and
-contractor profit, serving as total compensation for unit delivery. The contractor assumes cost
-risk, except for pre-stipulated price adjustment.
-When establishing a FFUP contract, ensure the following:
-1. Payment is for supplies or services rendered, not just for labor expended and materials
-acquired regardless of achievement. Each unit delivered and accepted provides a
-measure of value to the government commensurate with the unit price.
-2. Payment is for acceptable performance, not just best effort. The government pays only
-for supplies or services that conform to contract requirements.
-3. The unit price covers all costs and profit, not just labor, and the contractor bears the risk
-associated with all performance costs (e.g, labor and materials). The government bears
-the cost risk associated with the quantity of services needed.
-4. Fiscal controls (e.g., limitation of funds clause), as needed, are specified in the contract
-to avoid open-ended obligations.
-FC 16.2 Consumption-based contracting.
-A firm-fixed-unit-price (FFUP) contract may be structured on a consumption basis, in which a
-fixed-price is established for a unit of usage, such as a resource unit, and supplies and services
-are metered and billed based on actual usage over a predetermined periodic basis. A type of
-FFUP contract is a consumption-based contract.
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+team qualifications, while later phases examine technical details, pricing, and
+implementation plans from down-selected quoters/offerors. This approach reduces the
+bid preparation burden for industry while allowing agencies to focus evaluation
+resources on the most promising solutions.
+● Exchanges with the best suited quoter/offeror. Consider stating in the order
+solicitation, and then utilizing as advantageous to the government:
+○ Once the government determines the quotation/proposal that is most
+advantageous to the government based on its evaluation of initial responses, the
+government may communicate with only that best suited quoter/offeror to
+address any remaining issues consistent with the terms of the solicitation. These
+issues may include technical and/or price. If the parties cannot successfully
+negotiate any remaining issues, as determined relevant by the government, the
+government reserves the right to communicate with the next best suited
+quoter/offeror based on the original analysis consistent with the terms of the
+solicitation.
+● Comparative evaluation. The government may perform a comparative evaluation to
+select the quotation/proposal that provides the best value by comparing responses
+against the evaluation factors in the solicitation.
+○ Rather than assigning ratings to each quoter/offeror, the evaluation team ranks
+quotations/proposals against each other or, if sufficient, identifies the top ranked
+quotation/proposal for each evaluation factor.
+○ This streamlined approach focuses on documenting the rationale for how
+quotations/proposals rank relative to one another and explaining why the
+selected quotation/proposal represents the best value to the government. The
+evaluation and documentation should be efficient and proportional to the
+acquisition's complexity and value.
+● Confidence ratings. A type of adjectival rating system that permits evaluators to look
+holistically at the strong points and weak points of a proposal and then assign a
+confidence rating based on the evaluators’ overall confidence in the offeror’s likelihood
+of success.
+○ Confidence ratings can be used for any evaluation except for sealed bidding (part
+14).
+○ The confidence rating scale is designed to communicate the government’s level
+of confidence that a proposal will successfully meet solicitation requirements. It
+generally incorporates risk assessment, as that is often a natural aspect in
+determining the level of confidence the government has that a proposal will
+successfully meet requirements outlined in a solicitation.
+○ Best practices and use cases for the application of confidence ratings can be
+found at the Periodic Table of Acquisition Innovations (PTAI).
+48
 Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Companion
-This contract type may be suitable for procuring cloud computing or other types of information
-technology where the supply or service can be described in terms of usage rather than a
-specific product or task, ongoing and dynamic usage makes separate task or delivery orders
-impractical, and anticipated usage cannot be estimated to the level of certainty that would justify
-a firm-fixed-price contract.
-The contracting officer should establish a price for all estimated requirements. The contracting
-officer should also state a realistic estimate of the consumption and the total amount in dollars
-estimated to be expended in the contract. The contracting officer may obtain the estimate from
-records of previous requirements and consumption, or by other means, and should base the
-estimate on the most current information available. Although a consumption-based firm-fixed-
-price contract is not subject to subpart 16.5, to establish a binding contract the contract must
-provide for a guaranteed minimum amount of usage that is more than a nominal amount, but not
-more than the government is likely to use.
-The contracting officer should determine that the consumption monitoring capabilities offered by
-the Contractor will enable the government to adequately track actual usage before awarding a
-contract.
-The contracting officer should ensure that the contract provides appropriate fiscal controls,
-ensuring that the government will not be obligated to pay the Contractor any amount in excess
-of the amount of obligated funding identified in the contract, and the Contractor would not be
-obligated to continue performance if doing so would exceed this amount. As an example,
-language similar to the below could be incorporated into the solicitation and resultant contract:
-The Contractor shall—
-1. Provide, at no additional cost to the government, access to tools that enable the
-government to track its usage of services offered on a consumption basis; and
-2. Notify the contracting officer when total consumption reaches—
-a. 50 percent and 75 percent of the ceiling price for each CLIN for consumption-
-based services, or other milestones as agreed upon by the Contractor and the
-contracting officer; and
-b. 50 percent and 75 percent of the contract ceiling price, or other milestones as
-agreed upon by the Contractor and the contracting officer.
-In addition or in lieu of the language above, the contracting officer may use a limitation of funds
-clause when CLINs under the contract are incrementally funded, such as or similar to FAR
-52.232-22 Limitation of Funds, DFARS 252.232-7007, Limitation of Government's Obligation, or
-NFS 1852.232-77, Limitation of Funds (Fixed-Price Contract).
-FC 16.102 Factors in selecting contract types.
-There are many factors that a contracting officer may consider in selecting the contract type.
-They include, but are not limited to, the following:
-1. Commerciality: When acquiring commercial products or services, the contract types
-used should generally align with those prevalent in the commercial market.
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+● On-the-spot consensus documentation. Evaluators collaboratively discuss and
+immediately agree upon the merits and associated rating, as applicable, for a
+quote/proposal against specific criteria. This approach involves a team of evaluators
+reviewing a quote/proposal, engaging in a focused discussion to identify key
+differentiators, and then arriving at a unified assessment and corresponding rating in
+real-time.
+○ The benefits of using on-the-spot consensus evaluation include increased
+efficiency, as it streamlines the evaluation process by eliminating the need for
+multiple rounds of individual reviews and consolidations.
+○ It enhances transparency by creating a clear record of the evaluation team's
+collective reasoning and the basis for their consensus decisions.
+FC 16.507-2(c)(3) Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPAs) under multiple-award contracts.
+The foundation of the contracting officer’s decision to establish one or more BPAs under a
+multiple-award contract, when authorized, lies in thoroughly understanding the government’s
+requirement.
+Single award BPAs work particularly well when the government’s needs are highly integrated or
+sequential, where one task naturally flows into or depends upon another. Single award BPAs
+are also well-suited when standardization or scalability is critical (for instance, when there is a
+need for consistent processes, systems, or methodologies across all orders). Consider the
+value of relationship continuity; some requirements benefit significantly from a single vendor
+developing deep institutional knowledge or rapid delivery capabilities over time.
+Multiple award BPAs, conversely, are well-suited when requirements can be logically
+segmented into distinct categories. Multiple BPAs provide access to varied approaches and
+innovations, which can be particularly valuable for complex or evolving requirements. When
+surge capacity or broad geographic coverage matters, multiple vendors can provide the
+flexibility and redundancy your mission demands, especially if they are awarded based on
+specialization areas or geographic regions.
+Cost considerations extend beyond unit prices. While multiple awards may drive competition on
+individual orders, they also increase administrative overhead. Weigh these administrative costs
+against potential savings and consider the total cost of ownership, including any transition costs
+if vendors change. For high-frequency, low-dollar orders, the simplicity of a single award often
+provides the best value. For irregular, high-value requirements, the benefits of competition may
+justify the additional administrative investment.
+Performance risk represents another critical factor. Single awards create vendor dependency—
+if your sole vendor falters, mission impact could be significant. Multiple awards provide natural
+backup options and risk mitigation. However, this must be balanced against the complexity of
+managing multiple relationships and ensuring consistency across vendors.
+Market research will reveal whether meaningful competition exists. If the market offers diverse,
+qualified sources with meaningfully different approaches or capabilities, multiple awards could
+drive innovation and value.
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-2. Price competition: Normally, effective price competition results in fair and reasonable
-pricing, and a fixed-price contract is ordinarily in the government’s interest.
-3. Price analysis: Price analysis, with or without competition, may provide a basis for
-selecting the contract type. The degree to which price analysis can provide a realistic
-pricing standard should be carefully considered (see 15.404-1(b)).
-4. Cost analysis: In the absence of effective price competition and if price analysis is not
-sufficient, the cost estimates of the offeror and the government may provide the bases
-for negotiating contract pricing arrangements. It is essential that the uncertainties
-involved in performance and their possible impact upon costs be identified and
-evaluated, so that a contract type that places a reasonable degree of cost responsibility
-upon the contractor can be negotiated.
-5. Type and complexity of the requirement: Complex requirements, particularly those
-unique to the government, may have a greater assumption of risk by the government.
-This may be relevant to complex research and development contracts, as an example,
-when performance uncertainties or the likelihood of changes makes it difficult to estimate
-performance costs in advance. As a requirement recurs or as quantity production
-begins, the cost risk should shift to the contractor, and a fixed-price contract should be
-considered.
-6. Combining contract types: If the entire contract cannot be firm-fixed-price, the
-contracting officer may consider whether or not a portion of the contract can be
-established on a firm-fixed-price basis.
-7. Urgency of the requirement: If urgency is a primary factor, the government may choose
-to assume a greater proportion of risk or it may offer incentives tailored to performance
-outcomes to ensure timely contract performance.
-8. Period of performance or length of production run: In times of economic uncertainty,
-contracts extending over a relatively long period may require economic price adjustment
-or price redetermination clauses.
-9. Contractor’s technical capability and financial responsibility.
-10. Adequacy of the contractor's accounting system. Before agreeing on a contract type
-other than firm-fixed-price, the contracting officer should ensure that the contractor’s
-accounting system will permit timely development of all necessary cost data in the form
-required by the proposed contract type. This factor may be critical when the contract
-type requires price revision while performance is in progress or when a cost-
-reimbursement contract is being considered and all current or past experience with the
-contractor has been on a fixed-price basis. See FAR 42.302(a)(12).
-11. Concurrent contracts: If performance under the proposed contract involves concurrent
-operations under other contracts, the impact of those contracts, including their pricing
-arrangements, should be considered.
-12. Extent and nature of proposed subcontracting: Select a contract type that reflects the
-actual risks to the prime contractor if the contractor proposes extensive subcontracting.
-13. Acquisition history: Contractor risk usually decreases as the requirement is repetitively
-acquired. Also, product descriptions or descriptions of services to be performed can be
-defined more clearly.
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-FC 16.202 Application of firm-fixed-price contracts.
-This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs
-and resulting profit or loss. It provides maximum incentive for the contractor to control costs and
-perform effectively and imposes a minimum administrative burden upon the contracting parties.
-For firm-fixed-price contracts that include travel related expenses, the contracting officer may
-include a separate reimbursable line item for travel, as travel is generally a reimbursable
-expense under commercial practices. The contracting officer may use a firm-fixed-price contract
-in conjunction with an award-fee incentive (see FAR 16.402-3) and performance or delivery
-incentives (see FAR 16.403-2 and FAR 16.403-3) when the award fee or incentive is based
-solely on factors other than cost. The contract type remains firm-fixed-price when used with
-these incentives.
-FC 16.204 Fixed-price contracts with prospective price redetermination ceiling price.
-If the contract provides for a ceiling price based on evaluation of uncertainties involved in
-performance and their possible cost impact, the ceiling price should provide for assumption of a
-reasonable proportion of the risk by the contractor and, once established, may be adjusted only
-by operation of contract clauses providing for equitable adjustment or other revision of the
-contract price under stated circumstances.
-FC 16.205 Fixed-ceiling-price contracts with retroactive price redetermination.
-Since this contract type provides the contractor no cost control incentive except the ceiling price,
-the contracting officer should make clear to the contractor during discussion before award that
-the contractor’s management effectiveness and ingenuity will be considered in retroactively
-redetermining the price.
-FC 16.302 Cost contracts.
-A cost contract may be appropriate for research and development work, particularly with
-nonprofit educational institutions or other nonprofit organizations.
-FC 16.303 Cost-sharing contracts.
-A cost-sharing contract may be appropriate when the contractor agrees to absorb a portion of
-the costs, in the expectation of substantial compensating benefits.
-FC 16.304 Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.
-This contract type permits contracting for efforts that might otherwise present too great a risk to
-contractors, but it provides the contractor only a minimum incentive to control costs. When
-considering whether to utilize a completion or term form of a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract,
-because of the differences in obligation assumed by the contractor, the completion form is
-typically preferred over the term form whenever the work, or specific milestones for the work,
-can be defined well enough to permit development of estimates within which the contractor can
-be expected to complete the work.
-An example of when a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract type may be suitable is when a cost-
-reimbursement contract is appropriate and the contract is for the performance of research or
-preliminary exploration or study, and the level of effort required is unknown. Cost-plus-fixed-fee
-contract type may also be suitable when a cost-reimbursement contract is appropriate and the
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-contract is for development and testing, and using a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is not
-practical.
-A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract normally should not be used in development of major systems
-(see part 34) once preliminary exploration, studies, and risk reduction have indicated a high
-degree of probability that the development is achievable and the government has established
-reasonably firm performance objectives and schedules.
-FC 16.403-2 Performance incentives.
-Performance incentives may be particularly appropriate in major systems contracts, both in
-development (when performance objectives are known and the fabrication of prototypes for test
-and evaluation is required) and in production (if improved performance is attainable and highly
-desirable to the government). Performance incentives may involve a variety of specific
-characteristics that contribute to the overall performance. Accordingly, balance the incentives on
-individual technical characteristics so that no one of them is exaggerated to the detriment of the
-overall performance. Performance tests and/or assessments of work performance are generally
-essential in order to determine the degree of attainment of performance targets. Therefore, be
-as specific as possible in the contract in establishing test criteria (such as testing conditions,
-instrumentation precision, and data interpretation) and performance standards (such as the
-quality levels of services to be provided).
-Because performance incentives present complex considerations in contract administration, it is
-a best practice to negotiate them in full coordination with government engineering and pricing
-specialists. And it is extremely useful if the government and contractor agree explicitly on the
-effect that contract changes (e.g., pursuant to the Changes clause) will have on performance
-incentives. In establishing performance criteria, the contractor should not be rewarded or
-penalized for obtaining government-furnished components.
-FC 16.403-3 Delivery incentives.
-It is important to determine the government’s primary objectives in a given contract when
-establishing delivery incentives (e.g., earliest possible delivery or earliest quantity production).
-FC 16.404-1 Fixed-price incentive (firm target) contracts.
-Under a fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract, the price ceiling is the maximum that may be
-paid to the contractor, except for any adjustment under other contract clauses. When the
-contractor completes performance, the parties negotiate the final cost, and the final price is
-established by applying the formula. Because the profit varies inversely with the cost, this
-contract type provides a positive, calculable profit incentive for the contractor to control costs.
-A fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract is appropriate when the parties can negotiate at the
-outset a firm target cost, target profit, and profit adjustment formula that will provide a fair and
-reasonable incentive and a ceiling that provides for the contractor to assume an appropriate
-share of the risk. When the contractor assumes a considerable or major share of the cost
-responsibility under the adjustment formula, the target profit should reflect this responsibility.
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-FC 16.404-2 Fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contract ceiling price.
-When the production point specified in the contract is reached, the parties negotiate the firm
-target cost, giving consideration to cost experience under the contract and other pertinent
-factors. The firm target profit is established by the formula. At this point, the parties have two
-alternatives, as follows:
-1. They may negotiate a firm fixed price, using the firm target cost plus the firm target profit
-as a guide.
-2. If negotiation of a firm fixed price is inappropriate, they may negotiate a formula for
-establishing the final price using the firm target cost and firm target profit. The final cost
-is then negotiated at completion, and the final profit is established by formula, as under
-the fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract (see FAR 16.404-1).
-FC 16.405 Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts.
-A cost-plus-incentive-fee contract may be appropriate for services or development and test
-programs when a cost-reimbursement contract is necessary; and a target cost and a fee
-adjustment formula can be negotiated that are likely to motivate the contractor to manage
-effectively. Incentives should be tied to established technical performance objectives. This
-approach also may apply to other acquisitions, if the use of both cost and technical performance
-incentives is desirable and administratively practical. The fee adjustment formula should provide
-an incentive that will be effective over the full range of reasonably foreseeable variations from
-target cost. If a high maximum fee is negotiated, the contract should also provide for a low
-minimum fee that may be a zero fee or, in rare cases, a negative fee.
-FC 16.504-1(b) Contractor’s delivery obligations in an indefinite-quantity contract.
-Under FAR clause 52.216-22, Indefinite Quantity, the contractor "shall furnish to the
-government, when and if ordered, the supplies or services specified in the Schedule up to and
-including the quantity designated in the Schedule as the maximum." Consequently, any valid
-order placed within the maximum value is binding and must be fulfilled by the contractor.
-FC 16.504-4 On-ramps and off-ramps.
-On-ramping (adding new contractors) and off-ramping (removing contractors) from multiple-
-award contracts, especially when ordering periods are multi-year, helps maintain current,
-competitive, and innovative pools of vendors. The process allows for the government to remove
-inactive or under-performing vendors or add new vendors to the multiple-award contract.
-The government has discretion of how and when to open a multiple-award contract for an on-
-ramp or an off-ramp. These processes do not need to occur at the same time. For instance, if
-the marketplace has not significantly changed, the government may determine it is necessary to
-only conduct an off-ramp to narrow the existing multiple-award contract to only active and well-
-performing vendors. Conversely, if the current vendor pool is active and well-performing, but
-research demonstrates that sufficient new vendors have entered the marketplace, the
-contracting officer may conduct only an on-ramp.
-When considering methods to assess the multiple-award vendor pool for purposes of off-
-ramping, past performance on earlier orders under the contract should be given priority
-consideration (see FAR 16.507-2(c)(2)).
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-Examples of on-ramp and off-ramp procedures are covered in the Periodic Table of Acquisition
-Innovation.
-FC 16.505 Strategic inclusion of “continuity of services” and “option to extend services”
-clauses.
-For recurring and continuous service requirements, contract and order awards can face delays
-due to external factors like bid protests, disruptions to the incumbent contractor's business, or
-alleged bidding errors. To avoid challenging negotiations for short extensions, consider
-incorporating FAR clauses 52.217-8, Options to Extend Services, and 52.237-3, Continuity of
-Services, into all indefinite-quantity contracts where orders may be placed for vital services.
-Together, these clauses provide up to six additional months of performance beyond the stated
-task order period for unforeseen delays, and an extra 90 days for a smooth transition to a
-successor contractor or to the government.
-FC 16.507 Streamlining ordering procedures.
-Implementing efficient ordering procedures is crucial for maximizing the streamlined procedures
-under existing vehicles. While it is important to ensure compliance with the ordering procedures
-for the specific vehicle, consider the following best practices:
-1. Minimize redundant information: Refrain from requiring offerors to resubmit information
-that was already provided during the initial vehicle establishment. This not only reduces
-the administrative burden on offerors but also expedites the ordering process.
-2. Leverage previous evaluations: Unless there is strategic value in doing so, it is not
-necessary to re-evaluate information that was already assessed during the vehicle
-establishment phase. If the basis of that evaluation is unclear in the associated ordering
-guide, reach out to the vehicle contracting officer or program manager to learn more.
-Focus evaluation for an order on new or relevant information specific to the order,
-ensuring a more efficient and effective evaluation process.
-3. Harness innovative techniques: Building on innovative approaches used during the
-vehicle establishment, such as oral presentations, can further streamline ordering
-procedures. By maximizing the use of these techniques, you can reduce the complexity
-and time required for ordering.
-FC 16.507-2(a)(2) Periodic Table of Acquisition Innovations (PTAI) procedures for FAR+Your ordering patterns also matter. Predictable, consistent order volumes favor single awards,
+allowing vendors to optimize their operations and potentially offer better pricing. Variable or
+unpredictable needs may benefit from the flexibility multiple awards provide.
+Consider hybrid approaches that blend the benefits of both structures. You might establish
+multiple BPAs divided by geographic regions, functional categories, or order value tiers. This
+can provide competition where it adds value while maintaining simplicity where it doesn't.
+Regardless of your chosen structure, build in flexibility. Include periodic review points to assess
+whether the BPA continues to meet your needs and represents best value. Document not just
+your decision but your reasoning, focusing on operational efficiency and mission support.
+FC 16.507-5(c), 16.508 Strategic management of award notices, debriefings, and protest
+windows.
+To avoid unnecessarily extending the protest window, the acquisition team led by the
+contracting officer should prepare to quickly provide debriefings when requested after making
+award decisions and notifying unsuccessful offerors. This timing consideration is relevant for
+protestable orders (i.e., for civilian agencies, an order valued in excess of $10 million; for DoD,
+NASA, or the Coast Guard, an order valued in excess of $35 million; see 16.508) because
+unsuccessful offerors generally have 10 calendar days to file a GAO bid protest from the date
+the basis of protest is known.
+Note that an automatic stay of performance at GAO is 10 days after contract award or within 5
+days of a debriefing date offered. Please note that if the last day of the computation period is a
+Saturday, Sunday, or Federal holiday, then the deadline for filing is the next day the protest
+venue (e.g., GAO, soliciting agency) is open.
+FC 16.507-5(c) Debriefing best practices.
+When debriefings are requested, the acquisition team led by the contracting officer might
+consider providing technical evaluation documentation relevant to the requesting vendor.
+Providing this transparency may reduce the likelihood of protests due to lack of information.
+Debriefings should be framed as opportunities for vendors to learn for future proposal
+development and for the government to improve future solicitation preparation.